Subscribe
Conservatives and nationalists in Europe have in the last decade had a strategic advantage over the left with their capture of the youth vote. Phrases like “the most conservative generation since the Second World War” are frequently used by analysts when commenting on polls where the right-wing dominance for those aged between 18 and 29 is apparent, and this has subsequently been observed also in social media content patterns, value changes, and party sympathies. It has been generally true across the Western world, that the younger generations, though predominantly men and more rarely women, do not want the left-wing liberal establishment that has dominated their countries since before they were born.
This is why it should be alarming for the right in Sweden that a brand new poll, with just over one month until the next election, shows that the right, the so-called Tidö parties, is losing the young voters.
In 2022, when the right wing formed the Tidö government, the young vote favoured the right wing, with either the centre-right Moderates or the nationalist Sweden Democrats being the biggest party in the 18–29 age block. The dominant party of Sweden for many decades, the Social Democrats, were relegated almost to irrelevancy with the youth, as they regularly scored below even their main rival the Sweden Democrats when it came to young adults. Again, the difference between men and women was not insignificant, but it still confirmed the overall trend that the right was on the rise, and the left was in decline.
The most recent such poll, presented by major Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter, instead shows that the Social Democrats are once again in the lead; 25 points compared with the Moderates’ 19 and the Sweden Democrats’ 16. In 2022, the same poll showed 20 for the Social Democrats, 21 for the Sweden Democrats, and a remarkable 28 for the Moderates. Overall, the leftist sympathies of the youth has grown from 41 points in 2022 to 57 in 2026.
Is it not cool to rule?
What is the cause of this development?
For a few years in the 2010s, it seemed destiny that the youth would remain predominantly right-wing, and it was ascribed the cultural power relationship between the left and the right. The left’s overwhelming political power in institutions and elected government alike, together with its political correctness, made a ‘youth rebellion’ from the right necessary. The conservative and nationalist revolution of the 2010s has been compared to the new wave of leftism during the 1960s and 1970s.
Could it be so simple in the case of Sweden, that the right has held the reins of power for four years now, to the point where it is all of a sudden the left which is considered the ‘cool underdog’?
This may be part of the explanation, but hardly all of it. In practice, very little of what made the leftist paradigm of the 2010s so insufferable for many young adults, particularly men, has abated. There has been a thorough legislative change on migration issues, yes, but the social effects of this conservative renaissance has hardly yet been experienced. The cultural issues that made many right-wing men in the 2010s are still rampant, the same issues that are driving ever wider wedges between men and women today.
If one is to accept the past four years of political change as the engine behind the resurgent left-wing wave, there are a few other factors that may strengthen the argument. Perhaps the former young Moderate and Sweden Democratic sympathisers have for the past four years in power been alienated from their 2022 party of choice, and either resigned their party allegiance, or changed to a party outside of the ones measured in the poll.
While this is incredibly unlikely for the Moderates, it is not an impossibility for Sweden Democratic voters, who have minor challenger parties to its right which draw nourishment from disappointment in the Sweden Democrats. One political issue that has been very divisive among the young right is the conflict between Israel and Gaza, and it is not unbelievable that the dissonance between the Sweden Democrats and some of their voters has driven some young adults to leave the party in favour of one of its challengers on the right. This applies to other issues as well, including immigration, where the Sweden Democrats as a result of their coalition agreement with the other centre-right parties have had a more lumbering and legalistic approach than some of their more radical voters would like.
It is worth noting however that these nationalist movements outside of the major parties have failed to make a lasting impression in polls, hardly ever reaching one point even in the most eclectic of institutes. It therefore cannot certainly account for the significant drop in right-wing sympathies among the youth since 2022.
Demographics may be the key
One of the disadvantages of being in power is that the media spends much resources scrutinising policy, and with the current media establishment being firmly left-wing, the resultant image of the right-wing Tidö government is very likely to be negative. Especially regarding immigration, the negative media campaigns have practically run parallel to the opposition’s own campaigning. This has likely had the effect of turning many usually indifferent but left-leaning voters vocally against the right. Especially those of foreign backgrounds, who are often made to feel as though they are targeted by the government’s crackdown on illegal migrants.
One media campaign in particular that is very likely to have awoken left-wing sympathies is the unrelenting negative coverage of “teenage deportations”; the timing-out of residence permits to children of labour migrants upon becoming of age – commonly at age 18, but sometimes at 21, depending on the circumstances of the permits. While this much-debated legislation actually builds on rules introduced by the Social Democrats already in 2021, it is the Tidö government that has had to carry the brunt of the criticism for alleged inflexibility and “inhumanity” during lawful repatriations of young adults.
The reality behind the supposedly insensitive programme to deport persons without legal permits to remain in Sweden is that the government’s efforts are in practice overshadowed by the Social Democrats’ own deportation works during the migrant crisis in the 2010s. The number of actual children deported in the aftermath of the 2015 arrivals far exceeds the Tidö number currently being critically highlighted by many Swedish newspapers. The skewed perspective, which by default paints the right as “inhumane” and “racist” and ignores the same actions taken by the left, probably produces many leftist voters.
Combined with the fact that young people with migrant backgrounds are seemingly deliberately being primed to help the left win the election, there is also the demographic development since 2022. The number of people with migrant backgrounds reaching the polled age bracket since the last election is certainly much higher than the number of ethnic Swedes doing so. This is the pattern in every migration-intensive Western society, that younger cohorts increasingly consist of people of non-native background. Naturally this starts affecting elections if the broad picture is that the right is opposed to these people’s being in Sweden, while the left is championing “equality”.
Is there a way out of this trap for the right?
More than anything else, it would perhaps be the standard cycle of the governing parties recouping their losses in another four years. The potential for disaster either in the economy, in crime, or in immigration during a left-wing election victory in September is looming large, and this will be a chance for the nationalists and conservatives to once again strengthen their narrative. It is harder to do so when you have been in charge for the last four years.