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The European Union’s participation in the U.S. initiative on chips and artificial intelligence is understandable given the competition with China. But Brussels must explain how this decision can strengthen—rather than weaken—European technological sovereignty.
Europe’s signing of the Pax Silica declaration is one of those news stories that, beneath its technical façade, reveals a political move of the highest order. The European Commission announced that it had signed the declaration on behalf of the Union, committing to cooperate with global partners to promote artificial intelligence and supply chain security. According to the official wording, Pax Silica aims to strengthen silicon supply chains and coordination among allies and trusted partners.
At first glance, there’s nothing scandalous about this. In a world where technological competition has become geopolitical competition, the West cannot afford fragile supply chains, opaque dependencies, and systemic vulnerabilities regarding semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, computing power, and digital infrastructure. Reuters has described Pax Silica as a U.S.-led initiative to secure the supply chains necessary for artificial intelligence—from energy to critical minerals, from advanced manufacturing to AI models.
The point, however, is not whether Europe should cooperate with the United States. Of course it must. The United States remains the free Europe’s main strategic ally, the pillar of transatlantic security, and the country that has successfully transformed innovation, private capital, defense, and industrial policy into technological power. In a global contest with China, Europe’s response cannot be digital neutrality masquerading as autonomy. No European capital, on its own, can hope to build the entire stack of artificial intelligence, chips, cloud computing, energy, and critical minerals.
The point is another: alliance does not mean delegation. It is one thing to participate in a Western coalition to mitigate risks related to China; it is quite another to accept that the critical infrastructure of Europe’s future be designed, financed, governed, and updated elsewhere. Technological sovereignty does not consist in producing every chip domestically, but in knowing which capabilities cannot be lost without also losing political freedom.
This is where Europe’s contradiction lies. On June 3, 2026—just a few weeks before the announcement on Pax Silica—the Commission presented its package on technological sovereignty, featuring measures on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, the cloud, and open source. The package includes the Chips Act 2.0, the Cloud and AI Development Act, an open-source strategy, and a roadmap for digitalization and AI in the energy sector. The Commission itself has acknowledged that Europe remains heavily dependent on external suppliers for critical digital technologies.
So the political question is simple: Is Pax Silica a tool to reduce Europe’s dependencies, or an elegant way to better organize them under American leadership? The answer is not written in the agreement itself, but in the terms that Europe will be able to negotiate after it is signed.
Europe has already experienced the risk of sovereignty that is proclaimed but not possessed. It produces advanced regulations, talks about strategic autonomy, and draws up industrial plans, but often lags behind in terms of actual capability. The 2025 report on the State of the Digital Decade states that the EU is still far from its goals regarding foundational technologies such as AI, semiconductors, standalone 5G, and digital skills.
This is the real wound. Europe does not lack rules; it lacks power. It does not lack documents; it lacks industrial, infrastructural, and energy capabilities. It does not lack declarations of sovereignty; it lacks, all too often, the concrete tools that make sovereignty more than just a phrase for press conferences.
For a European conservative, the answer cannot be digital autarky. Autarky would be costly, slow, and likely doomed to failure. But neither can it be dependence dressed up in formal attire. A mature political community distinguishes between what it can buy, what it can share, and what it cannot delegate. Energy, strategic cloud services, sensitive data, cybersecurity, critical semiconductors, computing power, essential open-source software, technical expertise, and control over public infrastructure are not mere commodities. They are levers of sovereignty.
The transatlantic trade precedent reinforces this concern. In the EU-U.S. joint statement of August 21, 2025, the Union declared its intention to purchase at least $40 billion worth of U.S. AI chips for its data centers and to work with Washington on technological security requirements aligned with U.S. standards, to prevent technology leaks to destinations deemed sensitive. This commitment is distinct from Pax Silica and should not be presented as an automatic consequence of the statement. But it illustrates the broader context: Euro-American technological alignment is becoming increasingly deep.
Alignment is not wrong. But any alignment must come with a clear political cost and a measurable industrial benefit for Europe. If we purchase U.S. capabilities, we must build European capabilities. If we enter a “trusted” supply chain, we must be suppliers, manufacturers, developers, and co-decision-makers—not merely reliable customers. If we share security standards, we must be able to participate in defining them, not merely adopt them.
There is also a democratic dimension. Euractiv reported that the Council gave the Commission the green light to sign the agreement after months of internal negotiations, and described the declaration as non-binding. Even a non-binding declaration, however, can influence investments, standards, procurement, industrial relations, and strategic choices. This is precisely where we need more political oversight, not less.
Decisions on technological sovereignty cannot remain the preserve of specialists, ambassadors, and officials. They concern the economic security of member states, the competitiveness of European companies, the protection of citizens’ data, and the freedom of action of national governments. A conservative Europe cannot accept that major strategic decisions are presented to the public only once they have already been finalized.
Pax Silica can be useful. It can strengthen Western supply chains, reduce exposure to China, give European companies access to high-level technology partnerships, and position Europe within the architecture of the digital future. The Commission argues that the initiative will create opportunities for European companies and contribute to prosperity, technological progress, and economic security.
But Pax Silica will only be truly positive if it becomes an environment in which Europe builds its own capabilities, not a framework within which it manages its own dependence. The difference is crucial. In the first case, the transatlantic alliance generates European power. In the second, Europe merely pays for access to a future built by others.
European conservatism should start from a simple principle: allies are indispensable, but sovereignty cannot be outsourced. Cooperation with Washington is necessary; industrial subordination is not. China represents a systemic challenge; but the response to the Chinese challenge cannot be a Europe reduced to a terminal market for the American tech stack.
We need fewer slogans and more capabilities. Less symbolic regulation and more productive investments. Less bureaucratic centralism and more accountability from member states, businesses, universities, scientific communities, and industrial supply chains. We need an energy policy compatible with data centers and advanced manufacturing. We need European public demand that rewards European solutions when they are strategic and competitive. We need to defend the market, but also prevent the European market from becoming merely a place where others sell critical technologies.
True European technological sovereignty will not arise from rejecting America. It will arise when Europe is strong enough to sit at the American table not as an anxious customer, but as a necessary partner. Pax Silica can be a gateway in this direction. But only on one condition: that Brussels and the member states stop confusing a seat at the table with the power to set the agenda.
Europe needs the United States. But it also needs itself. And in the age of artificial intelligence, anyone who does not control at least an essential part of their own infrastructure is not sovereign: they are connected. Perhaps even protected. But not fully free.Suggested category: Science and Technology / PoliticsTags: Pax Silica, AI, Semiconductors, Tech Sovereignty, United States, China, European Union, Supply Chains, Digital SovereigntyRegion: Europe / USA