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There has been a long drive in the EU to portray a new direction for the Union, where immigration finally has been put under control and citizens are protected when illegal migrants and criminals are deported as expected. Chair of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has many times appealed to the nationalist right with various measures aimed at countering illegal immigration across the Mediterranean, and working closely with the Italian government led by Giorgia Meloni to introduce a new paradigm when it comes to European border safety. Conservatives and nationalists across the EU may feel because of this that they have wind in their sails – this may be largely true, but one should be wary as to overestimate the commitment to well-managed migration that the current EU leadership has.
The boost to Frontex
One of the winners of the new long-term budget for the EU (2028–2034) is the outer border authority Frontex, which will see its total budget doubled and its manpower tripled for the next period.
On the face of it, this sounds like a remarkable investment, and an indication that there really is a new paradigm in Europe on these issues. Compare that to the attitude during the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016, when the EU as an institution was more committed to accepting arrivals than to ensure the legality of their asylum claims. The member countries themselves often took a similar approach, with the Swedish and German governments’ behaviours as stand-out examples of ideology before reality.
But Frontex is not a pure expression of border security and stable immigration levels. This is an institution that has its expressed mission to process illegal migration effectively and lawfully rather than to prevent it, as per statements from the current chief of operations Hans Leijtens. Frontex does aid in deportations, but does not have the mandate to forcefully prevent the entry of migrants, neither on land crossings nor out to sea.
Frontex instead operates by complementing national border security efforts, and often takes the initiative to offer aid to regions with spikes of illegal border crossings. One such example is the Belarusian border incidents in 2021, where Frontex monitored the repulsion of illegal migrants entering into Poland and Lithuania from the east. This migrant wave, primarily consisting of Iraqi and other Middle Eastern nationals, has widely been described as a hybrid war action ultimately stemming from Russia. The contribution of Frontex to the situation was questioned by the Polish and Lithuanian governments at the time, with criticism levelled toward Frontex’ scrutiny of the national authorities’ treatment of the migrants. Allegations of human rights violations were voiced by Frontex, which drove a wedge between the EU agency and the countries – Frontex was not helping, rather, it was perceived as sabotaging the effort to resist the weaponisation of migrants against Europe by Russia.
Additionally, one of the core missions of Frontex already today is to ensure the safe passage of migrant boats to European harbours, which is done in order to afford the passengers due process. This high standard of legal quality becomes somewhat misdirected, when the result runs directly counter to the pursuits of national governments to restrict illegal traffic, while putting the security of the migrants above that of the recipient nations’ citizens.
It is thus not a coincidence that some of the EU member states most severely hit by illegal migration, Poland, Romania, Greece, Malta, and Spain, all co-signed an informal declaration of a joint position in February 2026 that they wish not to expand Frontex’ mandate inside the member countries. Those most experienced with illegal immigration thus do not have the confidence in the EU’s main border enforcement agency to enforce their border. It is clear that Frontex requires a significant reform, as opposed to an upscale of its current framework.
Upscaling may lead to immigration surge
In the long-term budget, the number of Frontex personnel is planned to be raised from 10 000 in 2027 to 40 000 in 2041. Since the main task of the agency is to process migrants as opposed to guarding the border, this is an administrative investment that may sound good on paper if the goal is to cut waiting times for migrants, but this may lead to a surge in immigration to Europe in and of itself.
Invariably, a number of rejected asylum applications and subsequent deportations will be matched by an approval. The pace of legal immigration through the EU’s many paths is more likely to increase than decrease with this level of control – this may, just as the very low threshold for granted asylum back in the migrant crisis during the 2010s, create pull factors to Europe, where migrants will know that the pathway to a potential legal residence is quick.
The ability to process applications efficiently is different from the ability to prevent illegal entry. We know from experience that a migrant wave may come to European shores or borders in tens of thousands of people every day. This pace will never be matched by Frontex’ ability to deport rejected applicants. Instead, investments in migrant processing may lead to an ever growing spiral of additional resources being fed into Frontex, to meet the demand of the growing number of applicants.
The only way that this is going to work at least somewhat constructively is if applications are done in third party countries. There are ideas floating about the European political community to defer the asylum processes to embassies, which would lessen the pressure on European borders. Frontex resources could be located at various European embassies to make sure that fraudulent or insufficient applications are swiftly rejected. But having asylum processes take place on embassies also creates a more accessible pathway to European residency than an expensive and risky trip to the border, and the pressure may rise on the most popular European destination countries as a result of this too.
What Frontex should focus on
There is simply no discernable benefit for Europe to upgrade the administrative capacity of Frontex, and focus still ought to be to develop the agency’s ability to aid in actual border defense. Meeting migrants very early on at the point of entry to evaluate them is positive, but that is something that Frontex only does in emergency situations, such as in Ceuta in 2026. Perhaps they could have a permanent presence in some key harbours across Europe?
One of the services Frontex has been providing is satellite imagery and social media analysis in order to survey the prospects for migrant waves. This is auxiliary to physical border defense, and is something that Frontex could also develop further. Perhaps Frontex could even be involved with European governments’ efforts to spread awareness of the low prospects of a future in Europe through illegal immigration, by embarking on campaigns in countries with high push factors? This is a strategy that has successfully played a part for countries such as Sweden, when they started dropping as an attractive migrant destination.
But none of these efforts are of much use unless the culture and expectations of Frontex is changed. It is important to safeguard due process and the rule of law – but in cases such as when it indirectly aids illegal human trafficking, or enables potentially dangerous individuals to roam Europe freely, new routines and outlooks need to be in place. The leadership cannot proclaim the device that “no wall, no fence, no sea, no river” can prevent migrants from reaching Europe to be their guiding principle. They cannot undermine the effort of EU member states to lawfully deal with threats to their sovereignty, like during the Belarusian border incidents.
Until the European Commission addresses this, nobody should recognise their drive to rebrand themselves as pro-borders as genuine.