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For the first time since the founding of the Union, a real right-wing majority is taking shape in the European Parliament – at least on some key files: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, the group of Giorgia Meloni), Patriots for Europe, and Europe of Sovereign Nations. This is the configuration which, as Euronews has reported, made it possible to approve the “Omnibus I” package on corporate sustainability and due diligence, marking a shift of the Parliament’s political centre of gravity.
In Italy, many have already dubbed it the “Giorgia majority”, given the clear resemblance to the set-up supporting the Meloni government in Rome. And for Carlo Fidanza, head of the Fratelli d’Italia delegation in Strasbourg, that is exactly what it is: “We had promised that we would work to build a centre-right majority […]. It is the Meloni model, in other words the Giorgia majority replicated at European level,” he explained in an interview with Il Giornale.
From the “Ursula majority” to the “Giorgia majority”
Throughout the last legislature, the engine of the European Parliament was a centrist majority: EPP, Socialists (S&D) and the liberals of Renew, with the occasional support of the Greens. That coalition backed the von der Leyen Commission and its Green Deal.
The 2024 European elections, however, reshuffled the map: conservatives and sovereignists advanced, the socialists struggled, the greens declined. In this context, the supposed “red line” that was meant to separate the EPP from the more radical right has become increasingly blurred.
The decisive turning point came in mid-November: on the package revising ESG rules, the traditional EPP–S&D–Renew alliance split. Part of the left considered the compromise too favourable to business; many liberals hesitated. To avoid losing the file, the EPP chose another path: look for numbers on the right.
Thus, in practice, a new majority emerged: the EPP, ECR, Patriots and ENS, with support from some non-attached members. It is not formalised in a stable political agreement, but it has shown it can work on the “right” kind of dossiers.
The Omnibus I case: the first real test
“Omnibus I” is the first concrete test of this majority. The package intervenes on two pillars of EU corporate sustainability regulation:
- the CSRD (Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive), i.e. ESG reporting obligations;
- the CSDDD (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive), which requires companies to monitor human rights and environmental standards along global value chains.
The approach approved in Strasbourg significantly narrows the scope:
- sustainability reporting is confined to very large companies, with high thresholds for turnover and number of employees;
- due diligence obligations are eased and limited to multinational giants, excluding the vast majority of European firms;
- the requirement to draw up a detailed climate transition plan is scaled back.
For the groups on the left, this amounts to dismantling legislation on the environment and human rights; for the new right-wing majority, it is instead an act of realism: less red tape, more competitiveness, and an end to rules seen as unbalanced compared to American and Chinese competitors.
On this point Fidanza issues a warning: “I would have expected more courage from the EPP on the Climate Law […] There is no more time to lose if we want to avoid the industrial desertification of Europe.” It is a line that ties together criticism of the new 2040 target of a 90% emissions reduction and the demand to put the defence of European manufacturing back at the centre.
The precedents: Venezuela, deforestation, NGOs
Omnibus I did not appear out of thin air. Already in the previous legislature, an embryonic “Venezuela majority” had emerged: EPP, ECR and the right united in recognising opposition leader Edmundo González as the legitimate president of Venezuela, in opposition to the Maduro regime. It was a political, symbolic vote, but the signal was clear.
Equally significant was the tug-of-war over the EU deforestation law: on that file, the EPP-right front worked to postpone and dilute obligations placed on farmers and forestry companies, deemed excessive and harmful to European competitiveness.
Lastly, on more “internal” decisions – from the Sakharov Prize to working groups on NGO funding, and the rules on transparency in dealings with lobbyists – the centre has already fragmented several times, forcing the EPP to look rightward to avoid defeats in plenary.
Green Deal under review: 2035 car ban and climate policy reset
The decisive battle will now be fought over the future of the Green Deal. A symbolic flashpoint is the regulation banning the sale of petrol and diesel cars from 2035. For ECR, Patriots and a substantial part of the EPP, that deadline needs to be revisited: they call for technological neutrality, room for biofuels and e-fuels, and a more gradual path so as not to cripple Europe’s car industry.
Fidanza announces the clash in advance: “On 10 December the EU Commission will present the review of the regulation that bans diesel and petrol cars from 2035. We have always opposed the all-electric solution and stood for technological neutrality […]. If we win this battle, we will save the combustion engine, the SMEs in the supply chain and tens of thousands of jobs.”
It is likely that the same logic will be applied to other parts of the Green Deal: new simplifications of ESG rules, lighter obligations for SMEs, revision of intermediate emissions-reduction milestones. Whenever the issue on the table is loosening regulatory pressure, the right-wing majority will have the numbers to prevail – if the EPP decides to make use of it.
Migration, safe countries and returns: the next front line
The other major battleground will be migration. The Commission has put forward new proposals on returns, management of external borders and agreements with “safe” third countries. Here, the centrist majority is anything but guaranteed: socialists, greens and part of Renew oppose any tightening.
For the right, by contrast, this is the perfect dossier to consolidate its axis with the EPP. Fidanza puts it bluntly: “Fundamental measures will arrive in plenary, such as the EU-wide list of safe countries and the returns regulation, on which the pro-immigration left is against us and the only possible majority will be on the right.”
The declared objective is to build a migration policy based on structural agreements with countries of origin and transit, more effective returns, external holding centres outside the EU, and less influence for NGOs. The same approach that several centre-right governments are testing at national level is thus projected onto the European stage.
A Commission stuck in the middle
For Ursula von der Leyen, this evolution is a puzzle. Re-elected thanks to the combined votes of the EPP, socialists, liberals and greens, the Commission President had promised to keep the EPP away from the far right. But when her own group chooses to rely on right-wing votes on key files – ESG, the Green Deal, migration – the boundary becomes blurred.
As long as no alternative governing majority emerges, the Commission will remain in place. Yet every major dossier turns into a test of political survival: if von der Leyen pushes too hard on green policies and rights, she risks alienating the EPP; if she accepts the corrections pushed by the new right-wing majority, she risks a rupture with socialists and greens.
The centre of gravity shifts to the right
This new European legislature does not have a single stable majority, but two possible coalitions alternating in power. In practice, however, the centre of gravity of the Parliament is shifting to the right: the Green Deal is being re-read through the lens of industrial competitiveness, ESG rules are being softened, and migration policies are moving towards more control and more returns.
For Giorgia Meloni’s Italy, this is a political vindication: the centre-right governing formula is no longer a national exception, but a model that can be exported.
In Fidanza’s words, what is needed now is “courage on green and migrants”: if the “Giorgia majority” proves coherent and durable, Brussels could leave behind the season of green dirigisme and reopen the game on economic growth, sovereignty and the security of Europe’s borders.