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Over the past century, Europe has repeatedly oscillated between moments of strategic awareness and phases of deliberate amnesia. Stabilised periods are often followed by the assumption that power politics are a thing of the past, only to be rediscovered when circumstances force a return to reality.
This pattern has shaped not only European institutions, but also the political language used to describe responsibility, sovereignty and risk. In order to understand today’s choices, it is necessary to take a step back and recognise how often Europe has had to relearn the same lessons under pressure.
European debates on defence, energy and industrial policy have long reflected this tension. For many years, security was regarded as an abstract concern, addressed in strategy papers but with the focus remaining on regulation, redistribution and market management in daily policymaking. Strategic questions were postponed, diluted or confined to specialised circles.
The current moment is distinguished not by the emergence of new threats — Europe has previously experienced periods of instability — but by the growing realisation that postponement itself has become a liability. The decisions taken today will shape Europe’s ability to act for decades to come. This will be vital in responding to military crises, securing critical supply chains and maintaining political autonomy in a competitive world.
This editorial does not seek to celebrate individual legislative acts or institutional majorities. Its purpose is to examine a broader transformation: the gradual re-entry of strategic thinking into European policymaking. Defence readiness, industrial capacity and energy security are no longer regarded as marginal or exceptional issues. There is an increasing recognition of these as structural components of political responsibility.
For much of the past three decades, European integration has been guided by the assumption that stability could be guaranteed through rules, markets and interdependence. Defence, energy security and industrial capacity were regarded as secondary concerns, vestiges of a bygone era that were purportedly superseded by globalisation and institutional governance.
That era is now over.
A series of recent decisions taken at EU level — on defence readiness, industrial policy and energy security — point to a tangible shift in Europe’s strategic mindset. The adoption of the Defence Mini-Omnibus, the advancement of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), and the establishment of a permanent legal ban on Russian gas imports are not isolated events. Collectively, these insights underscore a mounting recognition that security cannot be improvised, outsourced or indefinitely postponed.
This shift warrants meticulous examination. This shift does not signify a sudden ideological conversion, but rather a convergence between political necessity and ideas that European conservatives have articulated for years.
The limits of a purely regulatory Europe
The European Union has long been described as a regulatory power. Its influence has been considerable, shaping markets, standards and legal frameworks both internally and globally. This approach delivered concrete results in areas such as competition law, consumer protection and environmental regulation.
Regulation, however, has its limits.
Security crises, military conflicts and geopolitical coercion have exposed the Union’s structural unpreparedness to operate beyond the civilian domain. Defence remained politically sensitive, fragmented across national systems and largely excluded from common funding mechanisms. Energy dependence was accepted as an economic trade-off, despite repeated warnings about its strategic implications.
Conservatives have consistently argued that this imbalance carries a cost. Political communities cannot rely exclusively on legal abstraction when confronted with material threats. Industrial capacity, energy autonomy and defence readiness are not optional additions to governance; they are among its core responsibilities.
The current moment represents a delayed acknowledgement of that reality.
EDIP and the return of industrial logic to defence
The approval of the European Defence Industry Programme marks a turning point in how the European Union approaches defence production. For the first time, defence is being treated as a structural industrial issue rather than as a temporary response to emergency.
EDIP matters because it recognises a simple truth: military capability depends on production capacity, supply chains and long-term planning. Ammunition stocks, maintenance facilities and technological development cannot be assembled at the moment of crisis. They require sustained investment, coordination and political commitment over time.
The conservative position on EDIP has been consistent. Support for strengthening Europe’s defence-industrial base has always gone hand in hand with scepticism towards vague frameworks lacking operational clarity. Early drafts of the programme were criticised precisely for that reason: they risked prioritising form over function.
The final text reflects several conservative concerns. It introduces limits on non-European components, acknowledges the need for a resilient internal market for defence goods, and integrates Ukrainian industry as a strategic partner rather than as a passive beneficiary. These elements do not guarantee success, but they bring the programme closer to its stated objectives.
EDIP should therefore be understood not as a final achievement, but as a test. Its relevance will depend on implementation, speed and political follow-through.
The Defence Mini-Omnibus and the normalisation of defence policy
The European Parliament’s adoption of the Defence Mini-Omnibus is a less visible, but no less significant, development. Unlike EDIP, this measure does not create new funding streams or launch grand initiatives. Instead, it adjusts existing EU programmes so they can be used more effectively for defence and dual-use purposes.
Its importance lies precisely in its modest appearance.
For decades, defence was implicitly excluded from many EU funding instruments. Research, infrastructure and digital programmes operated under assumptions shaped by a post-Cold War environment. The Mini-Omnibus revises those assumptions, aligning existing tools with current security needs while remaining budget-neutral.
What changes here is not the scale of spending, but the underlying logic. Defence is no longer treated as an anomaly requiring exceptional justification. It becomes an integrated dimension of European policy, embedded in research, infrastructure and technological development.
This evolution reflects a conservative understanding of governance: institutions must adapt to circumstances rather than preserve outdated taboos. A policy framework is valuable insofar as it serves real needs, not because it remains insulated from them.
Energy security as a strategic imperative
The decision to establish a permanent legal ban on Russian gas imports completes this broader picture. Energy policy has often been framed as a technical or environmental matter. Recent events have forced policymakers to confront energy as a security issue.
Unlike sanctions, which depend on periodic renewal and political consensus, a permanent legal ban creates stability and predictability. It removes a key source of revenue for a hostile power while reducing Europe’s exposure to external pressure.
For years, concerns about energy dependence were dismissed in the name of affordability or market efficiency. Reliance on a single external supplier, however, has always carried strategic risks. Conservatives have warned about these dangers for some time, drawing on historical experience rather than ideological reflex.
By transforming the phase-out of Russian gas into a structural legal framework, the European Union acknowledges that energy choices shape geopolitical outcomes. Markets do not operate in a vacuum; they exist within political realities that must be recognised and managed.
A convergence shaped by necessity
It would be misleading to describe these developments as a conservative victory in partisan terms. There has been no explicit endorsement of conservative ideology by Europe’s centrist forces, nor a comprehensive reassessment of past policy assumptions.
What has occurred instead is a convergence shaped by events.
War on Europe’s borders, coercive diplomacy and systemic vulnerability have narrowed the space for abstraction. Political actors who once resisted discussions of defence and sovereignty are now compelled to engage with them. The language has evolved, but more importantly, so have the instruments.
This convergence confirms a fundamental conservative insight: realism eventually prevails. Ideas dismissed as unfashionable or excessive often return when circumstances leave no viable alternative.
The risk of complacency
Acknowledging progress does not justify suspending scrutiny. European history offers many examples of ambitious initiatives that faltered at the implementation stage.
Defence programmes can be slowed by procurement procedures. Industrial strategies can be diluted by competing interests. Energy diversification can stall under economic pressure. These risks have not disappeared.
For conservatives, the task now is to maintain pressure for coherence and delivery. Defence readiness must translate into measurable capability. Industrial policy must support production across the Union rather than concentrate benefits in a few sectors. Energy independence cannot be postponed without consequence.
Vigilance matters precisely because the direction is now correct.
The question of strategy versus process: a European dilemma
A key challenge for European governance has been the tendency to confuse process with strategy. In the political sphere, the focus has often been on procedural completion rather than strategic effect. This is evidenced by the adoption of regulations, establishment of frameworks and creation of mechanisms. It was assumed that coherence would emerge automatically from compliance.
Strategic competition does not operate in accordance with this logic. It is important to note that power is best exercised through capabilities, timing and resilience rather than through procedural perfection. In order to achieve the objectives of defence readiness, energy security and industrial autonomy, it is necessary to make a clear prioritisation of these objectives, and to make political choices between competing objectives when necessary.
The significance of recent EU decisions lies precisely in their implicit challenge to this procedural reflex. By elevating security concerns within areas traditionally governed by technocratic criteria, Europe is beginning to reintroduce hierarchy into policymaking. It is important to recognise that certain objectives are of greater importance than others. It is important to note that the cost of delays can vary significantly.
The Union’s ability to move beyond process-driven governance and towards a genuinely strategic culture – one that accepts trade-offs, embraces responsibility and recognises that not all risks can be regulated away – will be key to determining whether this shift endures.
Europe’s strategic identity at stake
At its core, the current shift raises a fundamental question about Europe’s identity. Is the European Union content to remain a regulatory space, influential in norms but dependent in power? Or does it intend to act as a strategic actor capable of defending its interests and values?
Civilisation requires protection — a point conservatives have long made. Rights, prosperity, and openness depend on security, not the other way around. The growing alignment around defence, industry, and energy suggests that this argument is gaining ground beyond its traditional constituency.
Europe’s emerging lucidity is not ideological enthusiasm. It is the product of necessity. The challenge now is to ensure that this clarity becomes permanent, shaping policy not only in moments of crisis but as a lasting orientation.
History has returned to Europe. The question is whether Europe will remain attentive once the urgency fades.
Strategic shifts in business do not become credible through legislation alone. The significance of these events is only recognised when political leaders accept responsibility for the results of their actions, rather than their intentions. Europe has frequently demonstrated proficiency in establishing ambitious goals while allocating responsibility, thereby creating a comfortable distance between decisions and their consequences.
The current phase will test the ability to break that pattern. Defence readiness, energy security and industrial resilience impose costs, trade-offs and political risk. They call for leadership that is able to articulate the rationale behind these choices to the public, rather than resorting to the evasion of responsibility that often accompanies institutional complexity.
In this regard, the true gauge of Europe’s strategic maturity will not be found in policy documents, but in its readiness to assume responsibility for the consequences of its actions — or inactions — in a more challenging global environment.