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Non‑governmental organisations (NGOs) do not receive formal “judicial powers” under the new EU anti‑corruption directive, but they are given new, quasi‑procedural roles that raise questions about democratic accountability and the balance of powers in Romania’s justice system. The news about Romanian NGOs and fact-checker networks “Declic” and “Funky Citizens” joining a government working group on justice laws illustrates how such NGOs can gain significant influence over how corruption is defined, investigated and sanctioned, even though their funding and internal accountability are often opaque.
The compromise text of the directive on combating corruption includes a specific article on “rights for the public concerned to participate in proceedings.”
- Article 23d requires Member States to give “persons affected or likely to be affected” and NGOs “involved in the fight against corruption” appropriate procedural rights in criminal proceedings, whenever similar rights exist for other crimes (for example, participation as a civil party).
- This means Romanian NGOs that meet national law criteria could intervene in corruption trials, submit evidence, appeal certain decisions or seek damages, depending on how Romania transposes these provisions.
Legally, these are not classic judicial powers like those of prosecutors or judges, but in practice they move NGOs closer to the heart of criminal justice, with the ability to shape cases, signal preferred interpretations of the law and exert pressure on magistrates.
The directive also explicitly frames “independent civil society organisations” and NGOs as “essential watchdogs” that help hold those in power accountable and promote respect for fundamental rights.
- Member States are instructed to “promote the participation of civil society, academia, non‑governmental organizations and community‑based organizations in anti‑corruption activities.”
- Governments must also draw up national anti‑corruption strategies “in consultation with civil society” and other stakeholders.
In Romania, the fact that already members of the Declic and Funky Citizens NGOs are taking part in a government working group on justice laws is a concrete example of this new model: NGOs move from outside critics into the co‑author role for legislation that will govern prosecutors, judges and anti‑corruption procedures. This blurs the line between civic advocacy and direct participation in law‑making and case‑level justice, especially when the organisations involved have strong ideological profiles or foreign funding.
The directive highlights transparency obligations for public officials (asset declarations, conflict‑of‑interest rules, transparency in political financing), but it does not impose comparable EU‑level transparency duties on NGOs that will participate in anti‑corruption bodies and criminal proceedings.
In Romania, many prominent NGOs active on justice issues are known for having progressive or left‑leaning positions and rely on transnational grant networks, which ordinary citizens cannot easily audit. When such groups are invited into government working groups and potentially into the courtroom as parties, their untested legitimacy and funding sources can raise concerns about indirect external influence over national criminal policy.
Romania’s Constitution is built on the separation of powers between Parliament, Government, and the judiciary, with prosecutors operating under legal control and democratic oversight. The directive itself acknowledges that Member States are not obliged to create new specialised courts, and that national autonomy must be respected.
However, several features of the directive put pressure on this architecture:
- The requirement to allow NGOs and “members of the public concerned” to act in the “general interest” in corruption cases risks creating a parallel track of private enforcement in an already politically charged field.
- The encouragement to suspend or reassign public officials accused of corruption, while still presumed innocent, could be weaponised in a media‑driven environment where NGO complaints and campaigns drive public perception.
If Romania transposes these rules broadly, prosecutors and judges may find themselves under dual pressure: formal institutional constraints and informal campaigns led by NGOs with strong political preferences.
Beyond the NGO dimension, the directive proposes several anti‑corruption instruments that sit awkwardly with existing Romanian law and practice.
- The directive pushes for longer limitation periods and tougher minimum maximum sentences for a wide range of corruption‑related offences, yet Romania has a history of frequent changes to prescription rules and constitutional court interventions; rigid EU ceilings may clash with recent constitutional jurisprudence on foreseeability and proportionality of criminal sanctions.
- It relies heavily on asset‑declaration‑based approaches, illicit enrichment, and confiscation mechanisms, assuming that administrative data are reliable and that institutions can process complex financial information; in Romania, years of underfunding, inconsistent asset verification and politicised disciplinary actions against magistrates suggest these tools may produce selective enforcement rather than consistent deterrence.
In a context where media trust is low and civil society is fragmented, importing this model could deepen polarisation: some citizens will see prosecutions as the arm of a NGO‑bureaucratic alliance rather than as neutral justice.