Europe Is Learning to Govern Migration Again

From the EU’s new migration strategy to the crisis in Ceuta, the European debate is changing. External borders, returns, cooperation with third countries and the ability of governments to decide who may enter are moving back to the centre of migration policy. For conservatives, the challenge now is to turn this change of language into lasting policy.

To understand how profoundly Europe’s migration debate has changed, there is no need to begin with a conservative manifesto. It is enough to look at the five-year strategy on asylum and migration presented by the European Commission on 29 January 2026. At its heart lies a principle that, not so many years ago, would have triggered an endless ideological controversy: Europe must be able to decide who comes to the Union and under what conditions.

That sentence matters more than it may appear.

It shifts the centre of gravity of migration policy away from merely managing consequences and back towards the capacity to make political choices: who enters, on what legal grounds, who is entitled to protection and who, following a final decision, must leave European territory. This is not simply a change in vocabulary. It marks the return of state capacity to a field that has too often been treated as though governments could do little more than administer movements determined elsewhere. The Commission’s new strategy brings together the protection of external borders, action against smugglers, partnerships along migratory routes, returns and a more assertive use of the Union’s diplomatic instruments. In February, the Council gave its final approval to the first EU-wide list of safe countries of origin and to changes concerning the concept of a “safe third country”. On 12 June, the new framework of the Pact on Migration and Asylum became applicable. On 1 June, meanwhile, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on a common European system for returns, including the possibility of return facilities located outside the Union, subject to the principle of non-refoulement and with safeguards for unaccompanied minors. These are separate measures, and it would be misleading to present them as though every element of Europe’s migration reform were already complete. The political direction, however, is becoming increasingly clear. The European Union is developing instruments intended to prevent irregular entry, process asylum claims more rapidly, work with third countries and make return decisions more effective.

Then came Ceuta.

The crisis at the end of July became a stress test for this emerging approach. Faced with a mass movement across the Moroccan border, the Spanish government deployed the Guardia Civil and the Armed Forces, reinforced the security apparatus around Tarajal and installed a pneumatic barrier at sea following a ruling by Spain’s Supreme Court that had restricted the immediate return of swimmers where no physical border structure was present. On 31 July, Pedro Sánchez publicly described what had happened as a violation of, and an attack on, Spain’s territorial integrity and pledged to use all the resources of the state to restore security and normality.

The European Commission, in the days that followed, likewise stressed the need to prevent further irregular crossings, protect the Union’s external frontier and ensure that returns are effective. It would be easy to interpret this simply as a contradiction within the Spanish Left. It would also miss the more important point. When a border stops being an abstract ideological discussion and becomes a concrete question of public order, jurisdiction and national security, the political vocabulary changes very quickly. Sovereignty, territory, control and returns are not extremist concepts. They are elementary functions of government. This is precisely where European conservatives can make their case without falling into caricature. Controlling immigration does not mean hostility towards foreigners, nor does it require denying the right to asylum. It means preserving the capacity to distinguish between legal and illegal entry, between those entitled to international protection and those who are not, and between immigration chosen by a democratic society and movements shaped by criminal networks, regional crises or pressure from outside actors. The available figures also suggest that public policy can influence migratory routes. According to Frontex, detections of irregular crossings at the EU’s external borders fell by 37 per cent during the first six months of 2026 compared with the same period in 2025, to just over 49,000. The agency linked the decline, among other factors, to cooperation with partner countries and preventive measures in key countries of departure. These are preliminary figures, and detections do not necessarily correspond to the number of individual people. They certainly do not prove that Europe’s migration problem has been solved. They do, however, challenge the idea that migratory flows are entirely beyond the reach of political decisions.

The so-called external dimension of migration policy therefore becomes crucial.

Readmission agreements, action against smuggling networks, assistance to local authorities, economic and diplomatic incentives and operational cooperation all increasingly mean that part of European migration policy must take place before migrants reach EU territory.

Ceuta, however, also exposes the other side of this equation. When control of a border depends almost entirely on the cooperation of a third country, that frontier remains vulnerable to diplomatic crises and geopolitical pressure. Europe needs partnerships, but partnerships alone are not enough. It also needs leverage, conditionality, operational capability and a credible returns policy. A decision establishing that a person has no legal right to remain has meaning only if there is a realistic possibility of enforcing it.

That is why the European agreement on returns matters. It introduces stronger obligations to cooperate for those subject to return decisions, common tools for Member States and the possibility of arrangements outside the EU under agreements compatible with international law. Control, of course, cannot mean arbitrariness.

A conservative European migration policy must remain grounded in the rule of law, judicial safeguards and respect for human dignity. But the rule of law also requires legally adopted decisions to have consequences. When a procedure establishes a right to protection, that right must be guaranteed. When a final decision establishes that no such right exists, the state must be able to enforce that decision. It is at this point that migration policy touches directly upon the ECR tradition. The Reykjavik Declaration recognises the “unique democratic legitimacy of the nation-state” and places national sovereignty at the heart of the conservative political project. That language is not decorative. Democracy is built upon citizens electing governments, governments being accountable for their choices and laws applying within a defined jurisdiction. The ability to govern access to that jurisdiction belongs to the same chain of democratic responsibility.

None of this requires abandoning European cooperation. Quite the opposite. Schengen makes a credible external frontier indispensable. The European Union can coordinate, finance, negotiate with third countries, support Frontex and establish common standards. But effective European cooperation should reinforce the capacity of Member States rather than dissolve their political responsibility.

In its 11 August briefing, which also addressed the situation in Ceuta, the Commission underlined how essential mutual trust among Member States remains to the functioning of Schengen and identified strong external borders, action against smugglers and effective returns as central elements of the European response. That may be the most significant transformation of all. For years, border control was too often treated as an essentially ideological or identity-based question. It is now increasingly recognised as a practical condition for the functioning of the European area itself.Europe has not suddenly become conservative. To claim otherwise would be self-congratulatory.

But the ground on which the argument is being fought has changed.

The Commission now speaks openly about preventing illegal migration, controlling external borders and making returns effective. European legislators are considering instruments operating beyond EU territory. And a Socialist government in Spain has responded to events in Ceuta in the language of territorial integrity and the full mobilisation of state resources. The question is therefore no longer whether Europe can control its borders. Its own institutions are increasingly answering that it must.

The challenge now is to turn that principle into a lasting capacity: effective, lawful and politically sustainable.

After all, freedom of movement within Europe can endure only if control of Europe’s external border is more than a promise written on paper.