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Europe’s defence debate is often framed as a choice between “more Europe” and “more national sovereignty”. A November 2025 EuroScope survey from Polling Europe suggests the public is thinking in a more pragmatic way: people want Europe to be safer, quickly, they can name the capability gaps they expect governments to close, and they are far less settled on the idea that defence should be the next justification for joint EU borrowing.
The survey was conducted online (CAWI) between 16 and 25 November 2025 on a representative EU27 adult sample of 5,115 complete interviews, with breakdowns for major countries and for European political families.
A broad “yes” to defence investment — but no consensus on building a single EU structure
On the core question—whether Europe should invest in defence—public opinion is not ambiguous. At EU27 level, 75% choose an option that entails increasing defence investment; 13% prefer not to invest, and 12% remain unsure.
Where the picture becomes politically interesting is the institutional route. Europeans divide almost evenly between two approaches: 38% prefer strengthening national armed forces while deepening cooperation with NATO, while 37% favour investment in a common European defence system.
This split matters because it points to a durable reality: capability and readiness enjoy a strong democratic mandate; centralisation does not enjoy anything close to the same clarity.
National results illustrate the uneven geography of perceived threat. Support for investing in defence peaks in Poland (89%) and is notably lower in France (67%), with Germany (76%), Italy (69%), and Spain (79%) in between.
The ECR electorate stands out: defence investment with sovereignty and NATO at the core
The survey’s political-family breakdown is particularly relevant for the European Conservatives and Reformists. Among ECR voters, support for investing in defence reaches 83%—well above the EU27 average share that chooses “not to invest”.
But the defining feature is not the level of support; it is the model. ECR voters show a pronounced preference for strengthening national forces and working through NATO: 53% choose that approach, while 30% prefer an EU-level defence system.
Within the political-group table provided in the report, ECR records the highest share for the “national forces + NATO” option. That is a useful reminder that an ECR-aligned defence agenda is not “anti-cooperation”; it is pro-cooperation under national democratic control, with NATO as the established framework for deterrence and interoperability.
Citizens are not asking for abstractions. They are naming concrete capabilities.
Perhaps the most operationally valuable part of the poll is the priority question. When Europeans are asked what matters most “right now” (up to three choices), the top items map closely to what recent conflicts and hybrid campaigns have already taught policymakers.
At EU27 level, the leading priorities are: improving airspace surveillance and protection against drones and aerial reconnaissance (36%); strengthening intelligence and counter-influence capacity (33%); building a missile-defence shield (30%); hardening external borders with personnel and infrastructure (28%); and expanding multinational exercises to increase readiness and coordination (23%).
ECR voters track the same “capabilities-first” order, with slightly higher emphasis on airspace protection and borders: 41% prioritise airspace monitoring; 36% intelligence; 32% missile defence; 32% border reinforcement; and 25% multinational exercises.
Two broader observations follow from these numbers.
First, Europeans increasingly define defence as more than heavy equipment: it is also the protection of critical infrastructure, the resilience of societies against hostile manipulation, and the integrity of borders—issues where governments can demonstrate tangible outcomes.
Second, these priorities lend themselves to cooperation without institutional overreach: shared standards, compatible procurement, joint training, joint situational awareness, and structured intelligence exchange can be expanded rapidly while preserving national chains of command.
The real political stress test is money — specifically, shared EU borrowing
If defence investment enjoys a strong mandate, the financing method does not.
On a proposal to create a European common debt instrument used exclusively for military expenditure, the EU27 public is split: 42% agree (13% strongly; 29% somewhat), 39% disagree (22% somewhat; 17% strongly), and 19% are undecided.
The national breakdown underlines how fragile a “European consensus” would be. Total agreement is 36% in France, 37% in Italy, 45% in Germany, 47% in Spain, and 44% in Poland—with sizeable “don’t know” shares in several countries.
Among ECR voters, reservations are clearer than in the EU27 average: 40% agree with common EU debt for defence, while 45% disagree; 20% are strongly opposed.
This is the key constraint for policymakers: if defence becomes a vehicle for permanent fiscal mutualisation, the political debate risks shifting from “how to protect Europe” to “how much integration the public has actually authorised”. The poll indicates that authorisation is, at best, contested.
Build strength through responsibility, not through federal shortcuts
The data point toward a conservative conclusion: Europe has a historic opportunity to rebuild credible deterrence, but it must do so in a way that preserves legitimacy.
Start with what citizens are explicitly prioritising. Airspace protection against drones, stronger intelligence services able to withstand hostile influence, a credible missile-defence layer, resilient borders, and a higher tempo of joint training are not ideological projects; they are practical protections that can be measured, audited, and improved.
Anchor cooperation in NATO, because that is where European security is already operational. The poll does not “endorse NATO” as a political statement, but it does show that a large share of Europeans—especially within the ECR electorate—prefer a model that strengthens national forces while working with NATO. That preference should be treated as a legitimacy signal: citizens want effectiveness and deterrence, not a reshuffling of sovereignty that could dilute accountability.
Reject the temptation to treat defence as the next chapter of fiscal union. The split on common EU debt is not a detail; it is a warning. When publics are uncertain, the prudent course is to prioritise efficiency, readiness and burden-sharing—through national budgets, procurement reform, common standards, and targeted cooperation—before reaching for mechanisms that many will interpret as permanent mutualised liabilities.
In short, the conservative case is not “less Europe”. It is a Europe that delivers security outcomes while keeping responsibility close to voters: national control where legitimacy resides, NATO compatibility where deterrence already works, and cooperation focused on capabilities rather than on creating new fiscal or constitutional faits accomplis.