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The European Union’s decision to impose new sanctions in December against individuals and organisations involved in pro-Kremlin information operations should not be misunderstood. This is not a cultural dispute, nor a debate about pluralism. It is a response to a form of hostile activity that European institutions and national governments increasingly recognise as part of a broader confrontation with Russia.
For years, Moscow has treated the information space as an operational domain. Disinformation, narrative manipulation and the strategic use of Western voices have become tools alongside diplomacy, cyber operations and military pressure. Europe is not a bystander in this confrontation; it is one of its main theatres.
From this perspective, the sanctions adopted by the Council are neither arbitrary nor symbolic. They target specific actors who, according to converging assessments across several European capitals, have played an active role in amplifying Russian narratives designed to undermine trust in Western institutions, fracture public opinion and weaken political cohesion inside the EU and NATO.
Sanctions are not about opinions
One point must be stated clearly. The individuals sanctioned are not being targeted for holding controversial views or for expressing criticism of Western policies. Europe remains a pluralistic political space, and disagreement is not only tolerated but intrinsic to democratic life.
What is at stake here is something different: the existence of structured, persistent and coordinated efforts that align with the strategic objectives of a hostile power. The profiles involved matter. Many of those sanctioned are former members of the military, intelligence services or law enforcement agencies in Western countries. Their previous roles confer credibility, authority and access, which in turn make their messaging more effective.
This is precisely why they are valuable assets in information warfare. Their interventions are not isolated comments but part of a repeated pattern: the same narratives, the same talking points, the same framing, circulated across multiple platforms and echoed by interconnected networks. In this context, intent and effect cannot be separated.
European institutions are not sanctioning dissent; they are disrupting infrastructure.
How Russian information operations operate in Europe
Recent cases illustrate how these operations function in practice. Disinformation campaigns rarely rely on crude or openly partisan content. Instead, they often use techniques designed to blend into the Western media environment: fabricated articles imitating established newspapers, the use of technical or security-related themes, and the rapid relay of content through blogs, encrypted messaging platforms and mainstream social networks.
Once a narrative gains traction in these spaces, it is often picked up by marginal political figures or self-described “independent analysts”, giving it a veneer of legitimacy. The aim is not necessarily to convince a majority, but to inject doubt, erode confidence and create confusion. Over time, repetition does the rest.
These dynamics are well known to European security services. Monitoring over the past years has shown that the same individuals and networks reappear across different operations, adapting themes but maintaining consistent alignment with Russian strategic messaging. This continuity is one of the reasons why the EU has moved from observation to action.
A necessary but imperfect instrument
Acknowledging the legitimacy of the sanctions does not mean ignoring their political implications. Measures of this kind sit at the intersection of security policy, law and public communication. They require not only legal robustness but also political clarity.
One weakness in the European approach lies in how these decisions are explained to the public. Sanctions are often communicated through technical language and administrative references, leaving space for hostile actors to frame them as opaque or arbitrary. Moscow is quick to exploit this gap, presenting itself as the victim of censorship while portraying Europe as intolerant of alternative views.
This narrative is misleading, but it gains traction when the political rationale is not clearly articulated. The issue is not whether Europe should act; it must. The issue is whether Europe explains its actions in terms that citizens can understand and defend.
Defending the information space as a strategic task
Information security is no longer a secondary concern. It is directly linked to national resilience, democratic stability and strategic autonomy. Allowing hostile networks to operate unchecked in the name of a misunderstood tolerance would amount to strategic negligence.
At the same time, Europe’s strength lies precisely in its ability to distinguish between repression and defence. The credibility of Western action depends on maintaining clear criteria: targeting coordination with hostile states, not generalised criticism; disrupting networks, not silencing debate.
This balance is difficult but necessary. The alternative is to leave the narrative battlefield to those who openly reject the principles on which European democracies are built.
The sanctions adopted against pro-Kremlin propaganda networks are justified and necessary. They reflect a growing awareness that information manipulation is not an abstract threat but a concrete instrument used against Europe and its allies.
However, firmness must go hand in hand with clarity. An EU that understands the nature of the confrontation with Russia must also be able to explain it. Not to apologise for defending itself, but to ensure that its actions reinforce, rather than undermine, the political legitimacy on which the West ultimately relies.
Defending the information space is not about limiting freedom. It is about protecting the conditions that make freedom possible.