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The Commission’s proposal would strengthen the agency’s role beyond the EU’s borders. It marks a shift towards priorities long advocated by the ECR, which must now translate into operational capacity and results.
“Europe decides who enters our Union and under what conditions.” Ursula von der Leyen’s words accompanying the proposed strengthening of Frontex on 27 October deserve as much attention as the measures themselves. In the statement published by the European Commission’s representation in France, control over entry is presented as a political responsibility to be exercised. For European conservatives, who have made border protection a priority, this is a significant acknowledgement.
The proposal gives substance to that reading. The Commission intends to enable Frontex to assist with returns from one non-EU country to another, through agreements with the countries concerned and in compliance with fundamental rights. It also proposes a dedicated Return Coordination Centre, a rapid reaction force and a gradual expansion of the standing corps to 30,000 officers, including a reserve of 17,000. Parliament and the Council must still agree on the new provisions: it would be premature to describe these powers as already operational.
The political significance, however, is already apparent. The Commission proposes giving the Union stronger tools to enforce migration decisions. This is precisely the ground on which conservatives have long argued that institutional credibility should be tested: the ability to establish rules and ensure they are upheld.
The problem is also evident in the European Parliament’s research. Its June 2026 briefing on return hubs cites Commission figures putting the return rate for 2025 at 28%. The document itself advises caution when interpreting this indicator: multiple decisions concerning the same person and unrecorded voluntary departures can distort the comparison. Substantial obstacles nevertheless remain, from establishing individuals’ identities to securing their countries of origin’s agreement to readmit them.
For a democratic state, this gap between decision and enforcement has consequences beyond administration. When a procedure establishes that a person has no right to remain, yet the resulting order has no practical effect, it becomes harder to explain to citizens what the rules are worth. Confidence in the protection system also suffers: upholding the right to asylum requires institutions capable of distinguishing between different circumstances and acting on their decisions.
There is also a question of fairness towards those who follow lawful routes. A migration system asks applicants to meet conditions, provide documents and accept decisions. Its legitimacy weakens when compliance appears optional once someone is physically present. Conservatives can make this argument without treating every migrant as a security threat. The relevant distinction concerns legal entitlement and individual conduct. Maintaining that distinction is essential to a policy that citizens can understand and authorities can defend.
The Frontex reform addresses this problem as part of a broader process. In presenting it, the Commission points to the new Return Regulation, which entered into force on 16 October. Strengthening the agency is intended to help put that legal framework into practice, alongside the digitalisation of procedures.
Extending operations to third countries is the most consequential step. In an article published by Euronews on 26 October, Vincenzo Genovese describes two possible applications: assisting non-EU governments in returning people present on their territory, and supporting operations from external return hubs. These are distinct functions, united by the intention to act across a geographical area extending beyond Europe itself.
Politically, this means recognising that migration management requires agreements and operational capacity beyond the border. To work, this approach will need to offer partners sustainable commitments and clearly defined responsibilities. A facility abroad cannot, by itself, overcome a country of origin’s refusal to readmit one of its citizens. Diplomacy and administrative implementation will remain decisive.
Cooperation must also be designed with political resilience in mind. An arrangement that depends entirely on the goodwill of one foreign government can become vulnerable when relations deteriorate. European governments should therefore insist on clear obligations, review mechanisms and workable alternatives. This is a practical concern for any external migration policy: moving part of the process abroad changes where responsibility is exercised, but does not remove the need to account for decisions, expenditure and outcomes.
This is where the conservative claim finds its most convincing foundation. In its statement of 24 April 2024 announcing the adoption of its election manifesto, the ECR Party identified strong external borders and a comprehensive security strategy covering land, sea and air entry points among its priorities. That position linked the management of migration flows to national responsibility and the protection of borders.
The continuity is even clearer on returns. On 9 March 2026, following the vote in Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the ECR Group supported the possibility of establishing hubs in third countries and emphasised the gap between return decisions and their enforcement. On 17 June, it welcomed Parliament’s approval of the regulation as a turning point towards a system capable of delivering results.
This sequence supports the argument that the conservative case is being vindicated. It does not prove that every provision is exclusively the ECR’s achievement, nor would it be credible to attribute an entire legislative process to one political family. It does, however, demonstrate convergence towards its priorities: stronger control, enforceable returns and cooperation with third countries are gaining weight in Europe’s institutional response.
For conservatives, strengthening a European agency also raises a question about how cooperation should work. It is useful when it increases states’ ability to discharge their responsibilities. Shared resources, coordination and operational assistance can serve that purpose, provided powers and accountability remain clear. Any assessment of the reform must also consider this balance.
That offers a concrete test of the conservative preference for a Europe that concentrates on tasks where cooperation adds value. Border pressures affect countries differently, while failures can have consequences for their neighbours. Joint operational support can help address that imbalance. Its justification rests on the assistance it delivers to national authorities. Expanding an institution should remain a means of improving performance, with budgets and staffing assessed against identifiable needs.
The same applies to legal safeguards. Sound agreements, properly grounded individual decisions and credible oversight are necessary to build operations that can endure and withstand scrutiny in court. As early as March 2025, UNHCR devoted a paper to the need for effective return systems and the potential role of external hubs in accordance with human rights standards. There is therefore room for a practical discussion in which effectiveness and the protection of individuals are addressed together.
The proposal of 27 October allows conservatives to claim an important political advance. It also requires them to remain demanding about results. Larger staffing commitments must translate into available personnel; agreements must make actual operations possible; procedures must reach a conclusion within workable timeframes.
Public reporting should make that assessment possible. Governments should explain which obstacles persist, whether cooperation agreements are functioning and where additional resources produce measurable improvements. Without such scrutiny, institutional expansion risks becoming an achievement celebrated chiefly by the institutions themselves. A serious reform must invite examination of its performance.
The change of approach is visible in the priorities the Commission has chosen to turn into a proposal. Its credibility will depend on implementation. For those who have long argued for these policies, the task now is to follow the negotiations and ensure that the announced ambition is not lost in compromises or administrative difficulties. Citizens will be right to judge the shift by its effects.