The COVID-19 pandemic did not affect me much. I was wintering in Rio de Janeiro in March 2020 when the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised all Icelanders abroad to return home as soon as possible. I decided to do so, mainly because of the uncertainty about what could happen. The journey home was eerie, on almost empty aeroplanes through half-empty airports. Once in Reykjavik, I could work on my laptop at home. Needless to say, I continued to receive my monthly salary as professor. Either I was not infected, or I caught the disease in such a mild form that I did not notice; I never bothered to test for it. I chose to be vaccinated twice, without any adverse effects.
The Failure to Weigh Costs and Benefits Together
Others were not as fortunate, alas. The pandemic resulted in 7,1 million confirmed deaths worldwide, and it probably contributed to many more deaths, not only because infection weakened already frail people who died of other causes, but also because serious diseases, such as cancer, were neglected. Lockdowns turned the lives of hundreds of millions, if not billions, upside down. The burdens were distributed unevenly, with the ‘laptop class’ largely unaffected; some lost their jobs; others saw a significant reduction in their income or opportunities; children missed school, and many never returned; some could not say farewell to their dying parents; the use of alcohol and other drugs increased; public debt in most countries rose dramatically. Were the lockdowns worth it? This is one of several questions discussed in a remarkable new book by Princeton professors Stephen Macedo and Frances Lee, In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us. They present the evidence in a sober manner, but the conclusion is clear. Overall, the lockdowns saved few if any lives. When responses to the pandemic across the fifty U.S. states and other countries are compared, the death rate was, other things equal, no lower under stringent restrictions. What made a difference, however, was vaccination. The death rate was much lower among the vaccinated than among the unvaccinated.
The Suppression of Dissent
This is not wisdom by hindsight. The authors mention numerous reports written long before 2020 that expressed scepticism about non-pharmaceutical interventions during epidemics, noting their certain costs and uncertain benefits. But early in the pandemic, most (but not all) Western authorities embraced the Chinese model: vigorously enforced total lockdowns and complete border closures. This model could be implemented by the autocratic Chinese regime, but it was much more difficult to apply in liberal democracies. So, Western authorities had to try and create a consensus, and this seemed to require the silencing of sceptics. The main focus of Macedo’s and Lee’s work is indeed the suppression of dissent during the pandemic. For example, YouTube removed a public hearing featuring Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and the authors of the Great Barrington Declaration, which was critical of lockdowns. There was hardly any solid evidence that mandatory masks made a difference. Nevertheless, in the mainstream media and on social media, sceptics on this issue were dismissed as cranks. Children were at little risk from the virus, unlike obese adults and the elderly with underlying health issues. Nevertheless, people were not allowed to criticise school closures.
The Dismissal of the Lab-Leak Explanation
At first, some leading scientists in the U.S. and elsewhere wondered whether it was a mere coincidence that the coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, where a laboratory was conducting gain-of-function experiments. They were aware that security at the Wuhan laboratory was not stringent. But subsequently they decided to emphasise the theory that the virus was a natural product of evolution, not a laboratory construct, and that it had been transferred from animals to humans. Despite their original doubts, they felt this was necessary, ‘given the shit show that would happen if anyone seriously accused the Chinese of even accidental release’, as one scientist admitted. They probably also wanted to distance themselves from President Trump, who had spoken about the ‘China virus’. Perhaps most importantly, powerful members of the U.S. scientific community had provided funding for the gain-of-function experiments in Wuhan. They wanted to avoid the blame for a virus leak.