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The European Parliament’s debate on strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities comes at a moment when security is no longer an abstract policy field, but a daily strategic concern. What is at stake is not the creation of new slogans or institutional labels, but the ability of Europe to respond credibly to an increasingly unstable international environment. Europe’s defence debate is unfolding against a backdrop of mounting strategic pressure that extends far beyond the battlefield. In recent days, the European Union has intensified discussions on tightening economic and logistical constraints against Russia, including measures targeting maritime services linked to energy exports, while simultaneously grappling with growing uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship and renewed instability within key allied capitals. At the same time, a dense sequence of diplomatic meetings and security summits has exposed a shared awareness across Europe: deterrence today is no longer a single-domain issue, but a test of military readiness, economic resilience and political cohesion combined. Europe is not discussing defence in the abstract. It is doing so while the foundations of the post-Cold War security architecture are visibly shifting — politically, militarily and strategically. This strategic shift is not limited to troop deployments or military doctrines. It increasingly involves economic pressure, control of logistics and resilience of critical supply chains. Decisions taken at EU level on sanctions, maritime services and energy flows are now part of a broader security equation, blurring the line between economic policy and defence strategy and reinforcing the need for coherence between the two.
The NATO question is no longer theoretical
For the European Conservatives, the starting point remains unchanged: a stronger European defence must reinforce NATO, not compete with it. Any European initiative that duplicates command structures, weakens interoperability or creates parallel strategic chains would be counterproductive.
Recent events only reinforce this logic. Across Europe, this renewed focus on defence reflects a climate of strategic reassessment rather than a single triggering event. Governments are revisiting assumptions that for decades were taken for granted, often in response to cumulative signals of uncertainty rather than clear policy breaks. The risk, in this phase, is allowing short-term reactions to overshadow long-term strategic coherence.
According to POLITICO, several European countries — including Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway — have openly started discussing the idea of a European nuclear deterrent built around French and British capabilities, as a form of “insurance” against Russia. These conversations have been accelerated by renewed doubts about the reliability of the American security umbrella, following President Donald Trump’s confrontational posture towards allies and his controversial stance on Greenland.
This debate is revealing, but also dangerous if misunderstood. Nuclear deterrence cannot be improvised, nor can it be detached from NATO without serious strategic costs. France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear arsenals, but their doctrines, capacities and political constraints are not designed to replace the transatlantic framework. As several experts quoted by POLITICO note, scaling up such deterrence would be slow, costly and politically divisive — while risking escalation rather than stability.
In other words, the discussion itself is a symptom of insecurity, not a solution.
Defence credibility is built on capabilities, not slogans
This is why the ECR insists on a principle often ignored in Brussels: credibility in defence does not come from declarations, but from concrete capabilities.
Europe’s real weaknesses are not nuclear. They are conventional, logistical and industrial.
Military mobility across the continent remains fragmented. Critical infrastructure — from ports to energy networks — is still unevenly protected. Defence procurement is slow, inefficient and often distorted by excessive centralisation.
The upcoming “big week of crisis diplomacy” in Brussels and Munich, described again by POLITICO, illustrates the problem well. EU leaders will discuss Ukraine, competitiveness, strategic autonomy and transatlantic relations in rapid succession. Yet without credible military capabilities, these discussions risk remaining detached from operational reality.
Europe does not lack meetings. It lacks readiness. Readiness, however, is not built overnight. It requires sustained political will, predictable investment and a clear hierarchy of priorities. For years, European defence has suffered from fragmented planning and cyclical attention, with moments of urgency followed by long phases of inertia. Reversing this pattern demands not only higher spending, but continuity and discipline in how resources are allocated and capabilities developed.
Industrial strength, not bureaucratic centralisation
A stronger European defence requires a competitive and innovative industrial base. That means supporting major defence companies, but also ensuring that small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups can play a meaningful role — particularly in cyber security, space and dual-use technologies.
However, this cannot be achieved through over-centralisation at EU level. Defence innovation thrives where decision-making is close to operational needs. Excessive distance between those who define requirements and those who deploy capabilities risks slowing innovation and diluting accountability. Preserving national responsibility while improving coordination is therefore not a contradiction, but a precondition for effective defence integration.
Recent debates on sanctions against Russia offer a useful parallel. As reported by Euronews, the European Commission is considering a ban on maritime services linked to Russian oil, in coordination with the G7. While the objective — tightening pressure on Moscow — is clear, the process once again highlights the limits of a system that requires unanimity, complex coordination and constant political bargaining. This experience highlights a recurring structural challenge for Europe: the gap between strategic intent and operational execution. When decision-making becomes excessively procedural, even well-founded objectives risk losing effectiveness. In a security environment defined by speed and adaptability, delayed implementation can itself become a strategic vulnerability.
Defence policy would suffer even more from such rigidity. Operational effectiveness depends on speed, flexibility and national responsibility — not on slow, top-heavy structures.
The British factor and the transatlantic balance
The instability in the United Kingdom adds another layer of uncertainty. The political crisis in London, triggered by the Mandelson affair and the resulting pressure on Prime Minister Keir Starmer, risks weakening one of NATO’s key European pillars at a delicate moment.
A distracted or inward-looking Britain would not only affect NATO’s internal balance, but also complicate Europe’s strategic calculations — especially as London remains one of the continent’s two nuclear powers and a central military actor.
This is precisely why reinforcing NATO cohesion matters more than ever. Fragmentation within Europe, combined with transatlantic tension, would only benefit adversaries. Strategic competitors have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to exploit political hesitation, institutional fragmentation and delayed responses. Deterrence, in this context, is not merely a function of military assets, but of credibility over time. Consistency in policy signals and follow-through in implementation remain essential components of any effective defence posture.
A realistic European defence agenda
The ECR’s position is often caricatured as cautious or conservative. In reality, it is pragmatic.
Europe does need to spend more on defence — and spend better. It does need to strengthen its industrial base, improve military mobility and protect critical infrastructure. And it does need to take greater responsibility for its own security.
But it must do so without illusions.
There is no credible European defence outside NATO. There is no shortcut through institutional duplication. And there is no security without anchoring strategy to political reality.
The debate in the European Parliament should start from this simple truth: Europe’s strength lies not in pretending to replace the Atlantic alliance, but in making it stronger — through realism, capability and responsibility.