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When Russian forces crossed the Ukrainian border in February 2022, the operation was conceived as a blitzkrieg intended to be concluded within a few weeks. The goal was to quickly overthrow the Kyiv government, installing in its place a pro-Moscow leadership already identified and ready to take control. The Kremlin’s entire political and military architecture was based on the idea that the Ukrainian resistance would quickly collapse and that President Volodymyr Zelensky would be forced to flee or surrender. The operational reality, however, proved to be the opposite: the Ukrainian army not only prevented the collapse of the state, but forced Russia to withdraw from its most ambitious positions, particularly from the capital region and large portions of the southern front.
UKRAINIAN RECONQUEST AND THE REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL GAINS
In the first eighteen months of the conflict, Ukrainian forces managed to recapture approximately half of the territory occupied in the initial stages of the invasion. This was achieved both through operational Russian withdrawals, such as those near Kyiv and Kherson, and through successful counteroffensives in eastern Ukraine. From a strictly territorial perspective, after nearly four years of conflict, Russia’s real gains are extremely limited: the additional territory under Moscow’s control amounts to only about 1 percent of Ukrainian territory compared to the beginning of the aggression. This figure does not reflect the breadth of the Kremlin’s declared political objectives.
THE LINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AND THE KREMLIN’S UNFINISHED AMBITIONS
The prospect of a freeze in the conflict, modeled on the logic of the 38th Korean parallel, suggests that the future demarcation line could stabilize in the regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia along the current front. However, the Russian strategy envisioned full control of the disputed oblasts, a goal that has not been achieved. The only fully occupied region is Luhansk, considered among the least strategic in the eastern areas. In the most important region of Donetsk, Ukraine still retains control of a significant portion which, according to projections of possible agreements, should become a neutral, demilitarized zone. Overall, Moscow controls just over a fifth of the entire Ukrainian territory, a significant portion but far from the original plan of bringing Kyiv back under a direct sphere of influence.
UKRAINE’S HUMAN AND POLITICAL COSTS: DEFENSE AND SACRIFICES
Although Russia cannot claim a complete strategic victory, Ukraine has no reason to celebrate. The human toll of the conflict is devastating: a high number of casualties, tens of thousands of wounded, and a huge number of maimed – about half of the 360,000 total wounded. Added to this is the loss of territory which, in the event of a settlement, would be permanently amputated from the body of the state. These are sacrifices that cannot be minimized or relativized by comparing them to Moscow’s failed objectives. However, despite the erosion of the Ukrainian armed forces and the need to downsize, Kyiv would still retain one of the most significant military capabilities on the European continent: even reduced to approximately 800,000 men, the Ukrainian army would remain the largest in the European Union.
THE ILLUSION OF VICTORY AND THE FRAGILITY OF RUSSIA’S POSITION
The likelihood that Russia will present as a triumph what would otherwise be a Pyrrhic victory is high. If the Kremlin were to reject the updated peace plan, it would reveal the fragility of its negotiating pretensions, exposing the gap between the internal narrative and the reality of the conflict. Even an eventual acceptance would hardly allow Vladimir Putin to credibly claim to have achieved the original objectives of the “special operation.” The ambitions of political change in Kyiv, the rapid neutralization of the Ukrainian army, and the reconstruction of Russian hegemony over the entire country have clearly failed. The current outcome represents neither a profound political nor a solid military victory, but a compromise that reveals the structural limits of the imperial project launched in 2022.
A CONCLUSION THAT DOES NOT END THE CONFLICT
In this context, even reaching an agreement would not guarantee lasting stabilization. The frozen conflict would produce a persistent line of tension, while both countries would have to live with severe economic, demographic, and social consequences. What is clear is that neither Russia nor Ukraine can claim complete victory. Indeed, Russia, while maintaining significant territorial control, has not achieved the political and strategic objectives that had driven it to invade. Therefore, the “Tsar’s” alleged victory cannot be considered such if analyzed in light of the actual results, the costs incurred, and the ambitions with which the aggression began.