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By all accounts, the Swedish parliamentary election on September 13 turned out to be a so-called “mobilization election.” Victory went to the political side that succeeded in mobilizing the largest share of its voters.
After four years of right-wing governance, Swedes saw the four left-wing parties triumph by a margin just as narrow (approximately 1 percent) as the one by which the four right-wing parties had won in 2022.
A party requires 4 percent of the vote to enter the Swedish Riksdag. Small parties outside the Riksdag appear to have played a role in the election outcome. In 2022, several thousand votes went to small parties representing Muslim interests—votes that would typically have gone to the left. In this year’s election, these parties fared less well; the majority of votes that previously went to Muslim interest parties instead went to the Social Democrats (28.0 percent of the vote) and, above all, to the Left Party (8.4 percent).
Conversely, the right-wing bloc lost up to 60,000 votes to more hardline nationalist parties challenging the political establishment from the right, a significantly higher number than in the previous election. None of these parties came close to clearing the parliamentary threshold, but they siphoned off several thousand crucial votes, primarily from the right-wing nationalist Sweden Democrats (17.4 percent of the vote).
However, other factors may also have tipped the scales. Voter turnout saw a marginal increase; while 84.2 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the 2022 parliamentary election, participation rose slightly to 84.9 percent this time. Ever since early voting began three weeks before election day, Swedish media frequently reported that voter turnout appeared to be rising sharply among new citizens of non-European background.
This is a group within Swedish society that has previously shown remarkably low voter turnout. These are individuals who, despite becoming Swedish citizens, often have not assimilated into Swedish society and consequently do not feel particularly engaged with Swedish politics. They are also people who typically come from countries with weak democratic traditions and are simply unaccustomed to voting, or who may not grasp the point of casting an individual vote in a national election.
In many Swedish municipalities, authorities had actively worked to boost voter turnout in residential areas with high immigrant populations—areas where participation is typically lower than the national average. Furthermore, the Left Party (despite its small size) and the Social Democrats appear to have been significantly more active in these areas, mobilizing their own potential voters. Given the collectivist mindset characterizing some of the more traditionalist cultures now present in Sweden—persisting especially in certain segregated enclaves—it is quite possible that the increased mobilization widely reported in the Swedish media contributed to a rise in overall voter turnout.
The striking thing, however, is that turnout appears to have declined among other groups in Swedish society. While it is still difficult to extract precise data on voter shifts between parties, the exit poll conducted by Swedish election researchers on election day makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that turnout dropped among right-wing voters.
It may well be that the remarkable decline of the right-wing nationalist Sweden Democrats in the election—dropping from 20.5 percent to 17.2 percent—was caused not only by voters switching to other parties but also by several of them abstaining from voting altogether. This, in turn, could stem from a perception that the Sweden Democrats are now less rebellious and less “outside the system,” appearing instead as an established party that differs little from the other mainstream parties.
Immediately following the election, a debate began regarding the reasons for the Sweden Democrats’ decline. Party activists and sympathizers who want the party to maintain a hard line on migration argue that the party’s decision to slightly alter its rhetoric regarding immigration and Swedish identity caused some voters to abstain. Conversely, others argue that it was precisely the continued harsh rhetoric—particularly from certain prominent figures advocating a hard line against Islam’s growing presence in Sweden—that alienated a few voters. In any case, what is remarkable is that the Sweden Democrats were the only party on the right to lose ground in the election; the other three right-wing parties—the more traditional right-liberal parties—made gains. Thus, the right-wing bloc’s loss to the left-wing bloc was due to the significant decline of the Sweden Democrats.
An important observation to be drawn from all this is that Swedish politics appears to be undergoing the same process seen in Swedish residential areas and schools: a gradual segregation between immigrants and native Swedes.
Over the past 35 years, Sweden’s registered population has grown by two million people, rising from 8.5 million in 1990 to 10.5 million by the turn of the year 2025–26. This entire increase is attributable to the extensive immigration Sweden has experienced. Consequently, the number of eligible voters has also risen substantially; between the 1991 and 2026 elections, the electorate grew by 1,632,000 individuals. This represents an increase of approximately 25 percent compared to the figures from 1991.
Many these new voters are immigrants of non-European background. And there is good reason to believe that many of them vote for the Left Party or the Social Democrats. Far from all of them do so. And far from all of them vote at all. However, it is well known that the two socialist parties receive an overwhelming majority of the votes cast in immigrant-dense suburbs.
At the same time, the share of the total vote held by these parties in Swedish parliamentary elections has not increased; on the contrary, it has declined. In the 1994 election, the two parties together secured 49.7 percent of the vote, giving them a majority of seats in the Riksdag. In the 2026 election, they managed to garner a combined 36.6 percent. This represents a significant decrease over time.
What does this signify?
It likely indicates that the political landscape is being shaped by a process of segregation similar to those well-known from the housing market, the labor market, and the education system. It is a well-established fact that when a residential area becomes increasingly characterized by ethnic and cultural minorities, the majority population tends to move away—a trend that subsequently accelerates the influx of individuals from various minority groups (or from a specific minority group).
In the political sphere, it is evident that the Left Party and the Social Democrats are increasingly defined—in various ways—by the new population resulting from immigration. This applies to the parties’ representatives and voters, as well as the issues they champion. For the Left Party, this process has been intensified by the fact that it has been the most vocal Swedish party in protesting Israel’s military actions in the Middle East. Consequently, individuals from the Middle East who feel strongly about this issue have been even more inclined to gravitate toward the Left Party.
One need only look at the left side of Swedish politics to see how segregation plays out. The Left Party and the Social Democrats are increasingly characterized by representatives and voters with immigrant backgrounds. The other two parties on the left—the Green Party and the liberal yet progressive Centre Party—seem increasingly defined by native Swedish representatives and voters. It is as if they have divided the population between themselves.
Yet the major segregation occurs between the left-wing and right-wing blocs. The parties on the right increasingly appear to stand for Swedish society, characterized by native Swedish representatives and voters—or by people with roots in other countries who have assimilated into Swedish society.
A contributing factor to this apparent rise in political segregation is the new, more immigration-critical policy pursued by the right-wing parties between 2022 and 2026. Immigration has been significantly curtailed. The process of becoming a Swedish citizen now takes longer and entails stricter requirements. Swedish society has taken a firmer stance against Muslim “honor culture”—for instance, by banning cousin marriages and virginity tests. Furthermore, right-wing politicians now frequently emphasize that Swedish society is built upon Swedish values.
Many immigrants have simply come to perceive the Swedish Right as championing the interests of native Swedes, while the Left—by contrast—advocates for the interests of immigrants.
This is, of course, a generalization that requires nuance; it must be noted that many immigrants do vote for right-wing parties.
Yet a clear trend has emerged: the political landscape is no longer structured solely around the classic conflict between socialists and liberals, or even the newer divide between progressives and conservatives. We are witnessing a new conflict of interest in Swedish society—and likely in many other EU countries—between newly arrived citizens and the native population. Put simply, we have seen the emergence of political segregation.
An important lesson is likely that, in the long run, the political Left does not benefit from aligning itself too closely with large immigrant groups or pushing for increased immigration in hopes of gaining new voters. The result is that many long-standing voters are lost—and they are lost as they shift toward the right of the political spectrum.