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On 9 December 2025 the Irish Dáil debated the Second Stage of the Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2025.
The legislation, introduced by the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Helen McEntee, makes limited but essential changes to the Arbitration Act 2010 in order to allow Ireland to ratify the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and similar future EU trade agreements containing investment-court provisions.
The debate, and the subsequent voting division the following day, must be understood against persistent concerns in Ireland that certain elements of EU trade policy encroach on national sovereignty.
Those concerns crystallised in the 2022 Supreme Court judgment in Costello v Government of Ireland, where a 4–3 majority held that ratification of CETA in its existing form would be unconstitutional without prior amendment of domestic law.
The Court indicated, however, that targeted legislative adjustments could remove the constitutional obstacle. The 2025 Bill is the Government’s response to that judgment.
The ECR Group has consistently supported CETA. When the agreement was concluded in 2016, ECR representatives in the European Parliament described it as a high-standard, reciprocal deal that would deliver substantial economic gains while respecting the regulatory autonomy of the parties.
In 2016 the ECR successfully opposed an attempt by 89 left-wing MEPs to refer CETA to the Court of Justice of the European Union for an opinion that could have delayed or indefinitely delayed its entry into force with the final European Parliament approval arriving in February 2017.
The Group welcomed the subsequent provisional application of the agreement from September 2017 and has continued to regard full ratification by all Member States as a priority.
Since provisional application began, Irish-Canadian trade has grown significantly. Two-way trade rose from €3.2 billion in 2016 to over €10 billion in 2023. Irish goods exports to Canada reached €4.1 billion in 2024, while services exports stood at €3.7 billion.
Canadian foreign direct investment in Ireland has also increased, supporting an estimated 23,000 jobs.
These figures underline the practical benefits that CETA has already delivered without the investment-court provisions ever having been used against Ireland.
The Bill itself is short and technical. Its core provision is a new Section 25A of the Arbitration Act 2010, which permits the Irish High Court to enforce awards made under CETA’s Investment Court System (ICS) or equivalent mechanisms in comparable EU agreements, but only after a ministerial order laid before both Houses and subject to an explicit safeguard.
Enforcement is prohibited if the award would be manifestly incompatible with the Irish Constitution or with the autonomy of EU law. Direct leap-frog appeals to the Supreme Court are provided for, and any extension of the regime to new agreements requires positive Oireachtas approval through the 21-day resolution procedure.
Government speakers emphasised these safeguards and the economic case. Minister of State Neale Richmond noted that no ICS case has been brought under CETA or the parallel EU agreements with Vietnam and Singapore since provisional application began.
Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil deputies argued that the reformed ICS with its permanent roster of judges, random case allocation, binding code of conduct, appellate tribunal and explicit preservation of the right to regulate is fundamentally different from the discredited investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms found in older bilateral treaties.
Opposition contributions however focused on three main objections. First, several TDs maintained that the Bill still transfers an unacceptable degree of decision-making power to a supranational tribunal, even with the safeguards.
Sinn Féin, People Before Profit, Social Democrats, Labour and a number of Independent members argued that the possibility of multi-billion-euro claims could have a “regulatory chill” effect on future Irish legislation in areas such as housing, environment and public health.
Second, concern was expressed about the absence of pre-legislative scrutiny and the breadth of the ministerial order power.
Third, some speakers drew parallels with the Energy Charter Treaty and with ongoing EU-Mercosur negotiations, warning that approval of the present Bill could set a precedent for less carefully drafted future agreements.
On 10 December the Dáil divided on the Second Stage reading of the Bill passage. The result was 73 votes in favour and 63 against, a majority of just ten.
The closeness of the vote reflects the continuing depth of feeling on the sovereignty question and mirrors the narrow 4–3 Supreme Court majority in 2022.
From an ECR perspective, the outcome is to be welcomed. CETA’s Investment Court System, while not flawless, constitutes a material advance on traditional ISDS.
It introduces judicialisation, transparency and a Court review where previously there was none.
Specifically, the Irish legislation superimposes additional domestic safeguards: High Court oversight, constitutional incompatibility as an absolute bar to enforcement, direct access to the Supreme Court, and a requirement for explicit Oireachtas consent before the regime is extended to new partners.
Taken together, these features directly address the concerns articulated by the Supreme Court majority in Costello while permitting Ireland to complete ratification of an agreement whose economic value has already been amply demonstrated.
The narrow margin, however, carries its own lesson. Public and parliamentary trust in the European Union’s trade policy cannot be assumed.
Sovereignty anxieties, far from being the preserve of fringe opinion, now command significant support across rural and urban constituencies alike.
Future trade agreements will succeed only if they exhibit the same degree of transparency, incorporate equivalently robust safeguards, and confront sovereignty concerns directly rather than dismissing them as protectionist reflex.
Ireland’s decision to ratify CETA on these carefully calibrated terms is entirely consistent with a conservative approach to international engagement.
Genuine national autonomy in the twenty-first century is not preserved by withdrawing behind tariff walls or repudiating multilateral cooperation.
It is defended by participating actively in the design of rules-based frameworks that are reciprocal, predictable and constitutionally compatible.
The Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2025, passed after rigorous debate and fortified by multiple layers of domestic protection, allows Ireland to do precisely that.
In an era of geopolitical uncertainty and protectionist resurgence elsewhere, completing CETA ratification strengthens rather than diminishes Ireland’s strategic position. It secures preferential access to a high-value, like-minded market, reinforces the credibility of the European Union as a negotiating partner, and provides a workable template for investment protection in future agreements.
Again, the closeness of the vote serves as a salutary reminder that such outcomes are never automatic; they must be earned through a frank acknowledgement of legitimate concerns, and willingness to embed safeguards that command cross-party respect.
Ireland has now taken that step. The challenge ahead is to ensure that the precedent set by this legislation, which is limited, conditional and subject to continuing democratic oversight, becomes the standard for all subsequent EU trade initiatives involving investment-court mechanisms. Easier said than done I suppose.
A further aspect of the debate worth noting is how explicitly conditional much of the Government’s support proved to be. Even among those TDs who spoke in favour of the Bill, endorsement was framed narrowly around its specific drafting rather than any general acceptance of investor-court mechanisms as a matter of principle. Repeated reference was made to the High Court enforcement filter, the constitutional incompatibility bar, and the requirement for fresh Oireachtas approval before extension to new agreements. That emphasis is telling. It indicates that, in Ireland at least, future EU trade instruments will be judged less on their economic ambition than on the precision of their domestic legal integration.
The Arbitration Bill will of course return for additional debate, but given the governing parties majority and the fact that there was no indication of a rebellion within its ranks from any of the Independent members it is certain to be signed into law in due course.