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On 18 December 2025, a significant milestone was reached when trilogue negotiations finalised a political agreement on the European Union’s first common list of safe countries of origin.
This forms a key component of the 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum, which seeks to harmonise procedures across Member States.
ECR Rapporteur Alessandro Ciriani highlighted the deal as providing “tools that Member States have long called for,” enabling faster processing, greater legal certainty, and a renewed focus on cases deserving international protection, all without compromising fundamental rights or international commitments.
This agreement addresses longstanding inefficiencies in the EU’s fragmented asylum framework. National variations in designating safe countries have contributed to uneven processing times, secondary movements between states, and differing recognition rates for similar nationalities. The new EU list includes seven countries (Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco, and Tunisia) selected based on consistently low asylum grant rates across the bloc and assessments of general stability.
For nationals of these countries, applications can now benefit from accelerated border procedures, with presumptions of safety unless applicants prove individual risks.
Importantly however, the framework is flexible. Member States can maintain or add their own national designations, ensuring tailored responses to specific migration patterns.
Annual monitoring by the European Commission, informed by input from the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and other sources, allows for suspensions or removals if conditions deteriorate.
Some elements of the accelerated procedures can be implemented immediately, ahead of the Pact’s full application in mid-2026, offering timely relief to overburdened systems.
From an ECR perspective, this outcome reflects a maturing political dynamic in the European Parliament. Centre-right groupings have pushed for practical reforms that move beyond ideological debates toward enforceable policies.
By prioritising returns and cooperation with origin and transit countries, the list strengthens external border management and discourages unfounded applications driven by economic factors rather than fear of persecution.
This measured strategy upholds the EU’s humanitarian traditions while recognising the finite resources available for integration and support.
Ireland provides a compelling case study of how national safe-country designations can yield tangible benefits, and why EU-level harmonisation is a logical next step.
Since the enactment of the International Protection Act 2015, Ireland has operated a designation system defining safe countries as those where, generally and consistently, there is no serious risk of persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or threats from indiscriminate violence.
As detailed in a parliamentary reply on 4 December 2025, Ireland’s current list comprises fifteen countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, South Africa, Botswana, Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Malawi, and Morocco.
This roster has expanded progressively through evidence-based reviews conducted by the Department of Justice.
Early 2024 saw the addition of Algeria and Botswana, reflecting low recognition rates and stable conditions. Later that year, Brazil, Egypt, India, Malawi, and Morocco joined, aligning with broader EU trends on these nationalities.
The designation methodology is rigorous, incorporating data from the EUAA, UNHCR, Council of Europe reports, and reputable human rights organisations. Once designated, applications enter an accelerated procedure lasting up to 90 days, with applicants bearing the burden to substantiate claims of personal danger.
This shift has delivered clear efficiencies. For instance, Georgia’s inclusion in 2022, following a surge in applications led to a sharp decline: numbers halved in 2023, continued falling in 2024, and remained low despite minor fluctuations in early 2025.
A comprehensive review in May 2025 confirmed Georgia’s ongoing suitability, acknowledging improvements in democratic institutions alongside residual issues.
Similar patterns emerged with other designations. Western Balkan countries like Albania and Serbia have long featured low grant rates, often below 5 percent, justifying their presence. African additions such as Botswana and South Africa underscore assessments of democratic governance and absence of widespread conflict.
The overlaps with the EU list, Egypt, India, Morocco, and Kosovo, demonstrate Ireland’s forward-thinking alignment, while extras like Brazil and Malawi illustrate the value of national autonomy.
These measures respond directly to evolving migration pressures on Ireland. Post-2022, international protection applications surged, peaking at over 13,000 in 2023 amid global displacements and post-pandemic mobility.
Many originated from countries with stable conditions, straining accommodation provision and processing capacities. National designations have helped stabilise inflows, contributing to a notable 40-plus percent drop in applications during the first half of 2025 compared to the previous year.
This practical progress mirrors a profound shift in Irish public opinion, where asylum and immigration have emerged as paramount electoral issues.
Throughout 2024 and 2025, polling data consistently placed migration among the top three voter concerns, frequently surpassing traditional priorities like housing affordability and living costs.
A May 2024 Irish Times/Ipsos survey revealed that 79 percent of respondents felt the government needed to take stronger action on immigration, while 73 percent supported higher deportation rates for rejected applicants.
Other polls, including those from Red C and Ireland Thinks, showed around 60-65 percent favouring stricter policies overall. Concerns focused on system sustainability: impacts on public services, housing availability, thorough security vetting, and the distinction between genuine refugees and economic migrants.
These sentiments arose from visible challenges, including temporary accommodation shortfalls that led to street encampments in Dublin and regional protests over centre placements. Voters articulated a clear preference for reform: faster decisions to grant status to deserving cases and enforce returns promptly for others. Such efficiency, they argued, would preserve generosity toward the vulnerable while restoring faith in governmental competence.
By late 2025, enhanced measures, including tighter border documentation requirements and accelerated processing, correlated with reduced arrivals and easing pressures.
The ECR Group’s advocacy resonates strongly with these electorate priorities. It maintains that asylum systems must combine compassion with control: swift procedures deter exploitation, free resources for true refugees, and prevent politicisation of the issue.
Prolonged delays and low return rates breed scepticism, undermining support for protection obligations.
Ireland’s experience validates this view. National designations have demonstrably curbed abusive claims without blanket refusals, individual merits are still assessed, and protections granted where warranted.
Recognition, though rare for listed countries, occurs when evidence of personal risk is presented, ensuring adherence to the Geneva Convention.
The EU common list extends these principles bloc-wide. It establishes minimum standards, reducing incentives for secondary movements where applicants seek more lenient jurisdictions. For Ireland, it validates existing designations for shared countries and offers evidentiary support for future reviews.
Combined with national flexibility, this hybrid model promotes consistency while respecting diverse exposure levels among Member States.
Potential criticisms warrant acknowledgment. Advocacy groups have flagged human rights deficiencies in some listed countries, such as restrictions on media freedom in Tunisia or minority treatment in Egypt.
These points inform ongoing monitoring: both EU and Irish frameworks include review triggers and suspension options if safety presumptions no longer hold.
Nevertheless, the safe-country tool is not absolute. It facilitates prioritisation, not pre-determination. Case-by-case evaluation remains mandatory, safeguarding against refoulement.
In conclusion, the December 2025 agreement constitutes a proportionate, evidence-driven enhancement to EU asylum governance. It directly tackles public frustrations in countries like Ireland by promoting speed, fairness, and enforceability. As global displacement drivers, such as conflict, climate impacts, economic disparity, intensify, such instruments are indispensable for credible policy.
Looking ahead, the effectiveness of the common list will depend less on its initial composition than on its consistent application. If Member States fully utilise accelerated procedures and follow through on returns, the list can function as a credibility anchor for the wider Pact. If not, it risks becoming another formally agreed but weakly enforced instrument.